Authored by scholars, practitioners and scholar-practitioners, this volume marshals a kaleidoscope of perspectives on peace and peacemaking.

This book tells the story of the Sudanese revolution of 2019; of how it succeeded in bringing down the long-standing rule of President Omar al-Bashir; and of the troubled transitional civilian-led government that was installed in his place. It sets the scrupulously non-violent uprising in its historical context, showing how the protesters drew upon the precedents of earlier civic revolutions and adapted their practices to the challenges of the al-Bashir regime. The book also explores how that regime was brought to its knees through its inability to manage the intersecting economic and political crises caused by the secession of South Sudan and the loss of oil revenue, alongside the uncontrolled expansion of a sprawling security apparatus. The civilian protesters called for-and expected-a total transformation of Sudanese politics, but they found themselves grappling with a still-dominant cabal of generals, who had powerful regional backers and a strong hold over the economy. Internally divided, and faced with a deepening economic crisis, the civilian government led by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok has found itself in office, but with less and less real power, unable to change the conduct of political business as usual.

The metastasizing crisis in South Sudan requires a new strategy for achieving a sustainable peace. Conditions on the ground are unbearable for large swathes of South Sudan’s population, and regional peacemaking efforts are not delivering results. Absent any new variables, the parties to South Sudan’s war, particularly the government, lack sufficient incentives to make the necessary compromises for peace. Since an outright victory by any party does not seem realistic in the short run, the variable that actually could alter the parties’ incentive structure is much more effective, focused, and meaningful international pressure. The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) recently announced new sanctions designations for three South Sudanese individuals and three related companies associated with destabilizing South Sudan. This is a critical step forward, as is the new advisory from the U.S. Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) alerting financial institutions to the risk of potential movement of assets of South Sudanese Politically Exposed Persons. These welcome and promising developments are a positive step toward countering conflict financing in South Sudan. But much more should be done.

The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants is a critical aspect of conflict prevention in countries emerging from civil war. It is often designed and implemented in post-war situations to contribute to broader national recovery efforts through Security Sector Reform (SSR), primarily to support the twin objectives of 'sustainable peace' and 'development'. The justification for the DDR was based on the perception that 'peace requires breaking the command-and-control structures operating over rebel fighters... thus making it more difficult for them to return to organised rebellion' (Spear, 2002, p. 141). Following the ending of the war between the Sudanese's Government and the Southern rebels - the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in 2005 (Rolandsen, 2011), the security arrangements mandated the implementation of a DDR. According to the peace accord, the main antagonists, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLM/A should demobilise a substantial number of their forces. The accord envisaged the DDR in South Sudan as a provisional security measure to facilitate the fundamental challenge of proportional downsizing of force, rationalisation and standardisation of ex-guerrilla forces into a national army. During implementation, the DDR in South Sudan fell short of meeting its envisaged objectives. This failure formed the basis of this project's research question: What are the factors affecting the DDR in South Sudan? The main challenge cited by this project is the conflict's context in Sudan. The war between military Islamists in the North and the radical secessionists in the South created a political situation characterised by conflicting security and political demands, which sought a military strategic balancing and conflict manipulation. In the post-war South/ern Sudan, the effort to conduct the DDR was met with hostile socio-political conditions based on an attempt to maintain the status-quo of a united Sudan versus partitionist demands. This contradiction caused a tense post-war transition, a situation 'best described as a no peace-no war environment (Munive, 2013, p. 586). Despite the importance attributed to DDR in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the unwillingness by the SPLM/A to downsize its force, and the perils of designing and applying such a complicated process, failed the initial CPA-DDR. The SPLM/A was extremely hesitant or unwilling to downsize its forces 'due to a perception that the CPA was merely a ceasefire with the North' (Munive, 2013, p. 586). In South Sudan, however, the internal outlooks were not supportive of the DDR. The devastating civil war resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe that claimed the lives of millions and drove more away from their homes between 1983-2005. Since then, South Sudan has been undergoing a process of violence and security configurations between the different ethno-political groups. This condition makes it difficult for the Southern Sudanese to maintain the requirements for the DDR, especially the capacity to reintegrate the demobilised ex-combatants. Thus, this thesis identifies various socio-political and economic factors affecting the process of DDR in South Sudan. One of the main issues emphasised is that South Sudan emerged from war too fragile and fragmented along ethno-political lines. In this challenging situation, the DDR confronts debilitating problems. This lack of capacity means the South Sudanese state cannot meet certain functions that require centralised use of force. The main emphasis is that South Sudan emerged from war to peace, from rebellion to government, and from contested territory to statehood, in quick transition. This region has been without government or supreme authority for a long time and hence developed alternative governments. This fragmentation of authorities allowed multiple armed structures to emerge, with intersecting influences on the use of force.

South Sudan is the world's youngest independent country. Established in 2011 after two wars, South Sudan has since reverted to a state of devastating civil strife. This book provides a general history of the new country, from the arrival of Turco-Egyptian explorers in Upper Nile, the turbulence of the Mahdist revolutionary period, the chaos of the 'Scramble for Africa', during which the South was prey to European and African adventurers and empire builders, to the Anglo-Egyptian colonial era. Special attention is paid to the period since Sudanese independence in 1956, when Southern disaffection grew into outright war, from the 1960s to 1972, and from 1983 until the Comprehensive Peace of 2005, and to the transition to South Sudan's independence. The book concludes with coverage of events since then, which since December 2013 have assumed the character of civil war, and with insights into what the future might hold.

Irit Back’s From Sudan to South Sudan: IGAD and the Role of Regional Mediation in Africa comprehensively analyses the full achievements, shortcomings, and implications of IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) mediation efforts in Sudan and South Sudan.

After decades of civil war, the people of southern Sudan voted to secede from the north in an attempt to escape the seemingly endless violence. On declaring independence, South Sudan was one of the least developed places on earth, but with the ability to draw upon significant oil reserves worth $150 million a month, the foundation for a successful future was firmly in place. How, then, did the state of the new nation deteriorate even further, to the point that a new civil war broke out two years later? Today, with both Sudans still hostage to the aspirations of their military and political leaders, how can their people escape the violence that has dominated the two countries’ recent history? By giving voice to those who, after the break-up of Sudan, have had to find ways to live, trade and communicate with one another, Jok Madut Jok provides a moving insight into a crisis that has only rarely made it into our headlines. Breaking Sudan is a meticulous account, analyzing why violence became so deeply entrenched in Sudanese society and exploring what can be done to find peace in two countries ravaged by war.

A mere two years after achieving independence, South Sudan in 2013 descended into violent civil war, refuting US government claims that the country's succession was a major foreign policy success and would end endemic conflict. Worse was to follow when the international community declared famine in 2017. In the first book-length study of the South Sudan civil war, John Young draws on his close but critical relationship with the rebel SPLM-IO leadership to reveal the true dynamics of the conflict, and exposes how the South Sudanese state was in crisis long before the outbreak of war. With insider knowledge of the histories and motivations of the rebellion's chief protagonists, Young argues considerable responsibility for the present state of South Sudan must be laid at the door of the US-led peace process. Linking the role of the international community with the country's opposition politics, South Sudan's Civil War is an essential guide to the causes and consequences of the violence that has engulfed one of Africa's most troubled nations.

When asked in 2016 if he would step down as President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir replied ‘my exit could spark genocide.’ Kiir’s words exemplify how fear and the threat of mass violence have become central to the politics of South Sudan. As South Sudanese analyst Daniel Akech Thiong shows, it is this politics that lies at the heart of the country’s seemingly intractable civil war. In this book, Akech Thiong explores the origins of South Sudan’s politics of fear. Weaving together social, economic and cultural factors into a comprehensive framework, he reveal how the country’s elites have exploited ethnic divisions as a means of mobilising support and securing their grip on power, in the process triggering violent conflict. He also considers the ways in which this politics of fear takes root among the wider populace, exploring the role of corruption, social media, and state coercion in spreading hatred and fostering mass violence. As regimes across Africa and around the world become increasingly reliant on their own politics of fear, Akech Thiong’s book offers novel insight into a growing phenomenon with implications far beyond South Sudan.